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 1 
Introduction 
 
 This paper is based on research carried out by the authors between 13th July 
and 14th August 2009 to the three Central American countries, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua covered by the DCU led Active Citizenship in Central 
America project.1 The research visit on which the paper is based arose from a 
request from partners for Irish academics to engage with them and the 
region. As a result many of the different groups and individuals with whom 
we met are involved to a greater or lesser degree in the various components 
of the project. After consulting with partners, it was decided that the visit’s 
main aim would be to gather information and opinions on the main themes 
of the project; the involvement of civil society in the formation of public 
policy.  Since two of the countries (El Salvador and Nicaragua) now have 
left wing governments, with Honduras also experiencing a leftwards shift, 
until the recent coup, it was further thought that research should be placed 
in the wider context of this turn to the left in the region.2 A guiding question 
for all activities based on these considerations was devised: What is the 
relationship between the state and civil society in the three project countries 
in the context of the move to the left in Latin America? 
 Since the visit had this double function of engaging with the 
partners while conducting research at the same time, the project was 
qualitative and explorative (for a full list of events, interviews and 
participants please see Appendix 1). Research actions were varied: round 
table and focus group discussions, group and one-to-one interviews, with 
most interventions relatively open and unstructured. Methods varied slightly 
in each country and this was largely shaped by the local political climate and 
following the advice of partner organisations.3 We also had access to 
different populations depending on local participatory mechanisms and local 
project contacts. In Honduras focus group meetings were held with a 
Participative Mesa (Board) which had mixed social movement and local 
authority representation, while in El Salvador we met with a group of local 
youth leaders attached to a partner NGO, and in Nicaragua with 
representatives of Citizen Power Councils, which is a state promoted 
participative mechanism. Given the immediate post-coup conditions in 
Honduras, government officials were only interviewed in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. Nonetheless, the unifying thread is a constant exploration of the 
nuances of civil society/state relations within these differing contexts. 
The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief conceptual and 
contextual overview, we examine findings based on the different actions in 
each of the three countries. Each of these sections presents a synthesis of 
the discussions held. In the final, concluding section we outline common 
themes and sketch the implications for sustainable development practice.   
 
                                                 
1 This Irish Aid funded project seeks to strengthen Central American civil society by 
funding capacity building diplomas provided by local universities to NGOs and local 
municipal authorities in the poorest areas of the three countries, and research and 
advocacy projects on socio-economic issues proposed by local NGOs and universities. 
While elements of the project have existed for a number of years, the project in its 
present form is funded for a three year cycle beginning September 2007. 
2 The trip and research methodology was planned in conjunction with partners before 
the coup in Honduras which took place on 28 June 2009.  
3 Political events intervened providing differing possibilities for research. In El Salvador 
the new left-wing FMLN president had been in power only 60 days or so, while in 
Honduras a coup had taken place against the elected president of the country, who had 
been forcibly exiled on 28 June. In Nicaragua there was open confrontation between 
many NGOs and the ruling left wing party, the FSLN. All these factors have a bearing on 
project findings. 
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State Civil Society Relations in the context of 
democratic disillusion 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the concept of ‘Civil Society’ was adopted as 
a crucial tool to further democracy and development in Latin America. A 
notoriously contested concept, civil society can be both broad and narrow in 
its scope. Oxhorn (2003: 1) argues ‘Rather than focusing on real people with 
real needs, the tendency is to focus on intangible norms of “trust,” 
“associability” and “civic spirit.” Civil society’s foundation is seen as resting 
on the notion that rational (but largely faceless) individuals who decide to 
live together to further private, individual interests create civil society… 
Civil society becomes synonymous with “social capital,” …. and from this 
perspective it does not matter if people join bowling clubs, church choirs or, 
to take a “real” example from Latin America’s recent past, a human rights 
group resisting tyranny.’. For Volk (1997: 8), ‘civil society is that civic space 
which lies outside the direct control of the state and the market….. a 
complex assortment of non-state organisations concerned with a vast array 
of issues and operating on myriad levels from household life to trade unions, 
and from self-help movements and community associations to political 
parties’. Key here is that civil society is separate from the state and should 
not be under its control.  
Diamond (1999) advances a model for civil society which 
consolidates liberal democracy structures and market oriented economic 
policy: ‘Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private 
sphere and the state.  Thus it excludes individual and family life, inward-
looking group activity (eg for recreation, entertaining or spirituality), the 
profit-making enterprise of individual business firms and political efforts to 
take control of the state’ Central to his notion is a sharp distinction between 
state and civil society, where civil society acts as a check on the former’s 
actions, providing it with legitimacy yet it has little active role in decision-
making structures and processes. This model provides the guiding principles 
behind many international development interventions in the region and 
strengthening civil society became an important theme of donor 
intervention in order to strengthen democracy.  
Even by the mid 1990s, however, faith in democracy and 
democratic institutions was declining among Latin America’s citizens 
(UNDP, 2004). Some observers spoke of ‘democratic disenchantment’ in 
the region4 (Munck, 1993), while others invented ‘adjectives’ to qualify the 
shortcomings of the democratic project (Collier and Levitsky, 1997).5 Much 
of this sense of pessimism was rooted in the fact that the democratic 
transition had not addressed the region’s continued high levels of inequality 
and poverty but instead followed strict and, often damaging, market 
oriented development policies. Pugh (2005) reminds us that the effects of 
neoliberalism are not ‘benign’. Latin America stands out as the most unequal 
region in the world, while Central America demonstrates some of the most 
unequal and polarised societies.6 Arguably, the swing to the left in the 
region, starting with the election of President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 
1998, has been interpreted as a reaction to, and indeed rejection of, these 
                                                 
4 See: Munck, R(1003)  ‘After the Transition: Democratic Disenchantment in Latin 
America’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, No. 55 (1993) 
5 See: David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1007) ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research’ World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Apr., 1997), pp. 430-
451  
6 See World Bank (2003) Inequality in Latin America & the Caribbean: Breaking with 
History? Washington DC: World Bank Publications  
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neoliberal policies. For the first time in history, most governments in Latin 
America are from the left, and analysts talk now of an emerging ‘Pink Tide’ 
(Barrett, Chavez and Rodríguez-Garavito, 2008).  
One of the fundamental characteristics of this New Left is its 
search, to a greater or lesser degree, for a different relationship between state 
and civil society (Ramirez-Gallegos, 2006). Many of these governments seek 
to integrate civil society more in decision and policy making processes, 
making these more participative, as can be seen for example in initiatives 
such as participative budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, or in the ‘communal 
councils’ set up by the Venezuelan government. It could be asked indeed if 
these new participative mechanisms are more akin to ‘alternative’ 
perspectives on the role of civil society and its relation to the state (Howell 
and Pearce, 2001) than on the ‘mainstream’ perspective as exemplified by 
Diamond (1999).  
This ‘alternative’ perspective sees civil society, as Robert Cox 
(1999) puts it, as “the realm in which the existing social order is grounded; 
[but] also…the realm in which a new social order can be founded” (p.4). 
Since the end of the civil conflicts in the early 1990s, Central American 
countries have reconfigured relations between state and civil society. In 
many countries, a space for civil society to act without the heavy handed 
repression that had characterised previous decades was opened. A crucial 
part of this process was the funding by international development 
cooperation agencies of civil society projects to further strengthen these 
democratisation processes. Civil society was seen to have a crucial role in 
furthering these processes and deepening democracy in the region with the 
aim of it’s acting as a counterweight to the state, remaining autonomous 
from it, but at the same time strengthening its legitimacy. In order to 
understand contemporary relations between state and civil society, it is 
necessary to trace their development across the three countries.  
In this context, civil society is often collapsed into the narrower 
institutional remit of NGOs. As we will see, this slippage has had 
implications on three key and overlapping levels in Central America. Firstly, 
local understandings of civil society are contested throughout the region and 
opposing groups claim the space to the exclusion of others. Secondly, the 
development of civil society must be understood within the wider context of 
state development and the consolidation (or lack thereof) of democratic 
institutions. A key finding of this research in all three countries is that the 
institutionality of the state is secondary to partisan and economic interests. 
Finally, the election of leftist governments in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
and Manuel Zelaya’s attempts at progressive reforms in Honduras, have – to 
different degrees - exposed the fractious and delicate balance between state 
and civil society in Central America. The recent coup in Honduras ultimately 
exposes the fragility of the democratic project in that country and stands as 
a warning to its neighbours.   
 
Civil Society (NGOs) and the Turn to the Left in 
El Salvador 
 
On June 1, 2009 the first FMLN president, Mauricio Funes, was sworn in 
after having been elected by a narrow margin of 51.3 per cent, after a very 
tightly and bitterly fought campaign. According to Victor Valle (2009) this 
event ‘completes the settlement of the armed conflict that devastated the 
country in the 1980s’.7 Funes’ election has had an immediate bearing on 
                                                 
7 Since the Chapultepec peace accords in 1992, agreed between the then Salvadoran 
government and the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Group) guerrilla 
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state/civil society relations in the country. Many NGOs who have come 
from the left spoke of a spirit of cooperation between the new government 
and civil society that had been missing during the twenty years of ARENA 
government. As in many countries, civil society is regulated by government 
legislation and organisations must register as NGOs if they are to receive 
funds. As mentioned earlier, this has led to a certain elision between the 
categories civil society and NGO.  
NGOs identified a willingness on the part of the state to ‘listen’ to 
‘civil society’ for the first time. Mechanisms have been proposed by the new 
government to facilitate this, such as regular weekly meetings between civil 
society groups and one of the president’s chief advisors, to the setting up of 
a Social and Economic Council with government, civil society and private 
sector involvement to guide state policy in these areas; the formulation of 
local networks or ‘cabinets’ to tackle development issues in a coordinated 
way at the municipal level..  
This new willingness on the part of the government to include civil 
society participation in the formulation of state policy is, however, not 
without its challenges. Four principal risks have been identified:  
1. translating micro projects that work well on a local basis into 
national policy proposals,  
2. overcoming sectoral divisions to create a unified vision,  
3. dealing with loss or ‘migration’ of key personnel to the state,  
4. coping with increased state demands on civil society time and 
resources.  
Given that many NGOs emerged out of the FMLN and continue to have 
close links with the party, they must redefine their relationship to a state led 
by a more open government. In previous years, some feminist organisations 
spoke of the contradictions of ‘double militancy’ between civil society 
activism and party allegiance. For many, the FMLN electoral success will put 
this double militancy to the test. On the one hand, NGOs are more than 
prepared to cooperate with the state; on the other hand, such cooperation is 
contingent on results.  
A major test for the new government will be how it faces the 
hegemony of El Salvador’s powerful economic elite. Salvadoran state 
interests have been traditionally subordinate to the economic interests of 
this group (popularly referred to as the fourteen families) who have close 
ties to capital interests throughout the region. This has had a detrimental 
effect on the consolidation of state institutions and specifically policies that 
challenge inequality. This situation, common in all countries in the region, 
was one of the principal causes of the long running war in El Salvador and 
has not been addressed in the post-war period, leading some observers to 
question the dividends of the peace process for El Salvador’s poor (Pearce, 
1998; Hume, 2008). The inclusion of civil society also is recognised as being 
fundamental to this process.  
As in other contexts, there are questions as to the nature and 
composition of civil society, such as those raised by Oxhorn (2003). Does it 
matter that civil society is collapsed into NGOs, or should it also include, 
for example, gangs and business groups whose effects are not always 
progressive nor in the interests of citizens? Some respondents suggested that 
civil society is everyone – ‘ordinary people’ and not just NGOs. Others 
brought in the concept of citizenship to explain civil society – not just 
ordinary people, but people with rights and responsibilities. 
                                                                                                         
group, El Salvador has been ruled by the right wing ARENA (National Republican 
Alliance) party. 
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 Another question which arises is civil society’s relationship to 
political parties for example – is it antagonistic or cooperative? Historically, 
a majority of NGOs in El Salvador had strong party links (whether to the 
left or the right). FUSADES who have had strong links to the ARENA 
party have had great influence on economic policy, while others (with more 
leftist leanings) were ignored. This partisan division and polarisation 
between civil society groups and the state raises serious questions about 
political and social institutions and their effectiveness. It also raises concerns 
about the sustainability of development interventions when state institutions 
(at national and local levels) correspond to party rather than national 
interests. Working in this context of polarisation undermines many neat 
conceptualisations of both civil society and state.  
Invariably, polarisation raises issues of voice, participation and 
representation. Who dominates civil society – are there stronger groups 
within it, with greater access to the state? These are debates that were 
important in the Southern cone in the 1990s, especially in Chile where 
NGOs had huge influence on the Concertación governments and supplied key 
skills to the government. Following concerns raised in Chile (and elsewhere), 
does civil society (professional NGOs) risk replacing the state? Civil society 
is not unified therefore, but is divided between those groups who have more 
power and those who have less, groups often identified with particular 
ideological positions. A key challenge is to ensure that weaker groups can 
participate fully in society and in policy making, thus making the state 
stronger and more responsive to their needs.  
 
A political Mitch? The coup against President 
Manuel Zelaya in Honduras 
 
On 28 June, 2009 President Manuel Zelaya was ousted from power, when a 
group of soldiers took him from his home in the middle of the night at 
gunpoint and put him on a plane to Costa Rica. He has since remained in 
exile. A government was then installed headed by the president of the 
Congress, Roberto Michelletti, which has refused to agree to mediation 
efforts carried out by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, at the request of 
the Organisation of American States (OAS). The result is stalemate: the 
coup government refuses to allow Zelaya back while they prepare for 
elections in November. Meanwhile, the international community refuses to 
recognise any other government except that of Zelaya. Honduran media 
portrays the current situation as a clear case of Zelaya’s supporters against 
those who support the coup.8 Here we present a more complex analysis that 
focuses on the deep social polarisation of one of the poorest countries in the 
hemisphere.  
 Honduras’s economy, politics and society has many similarities with 
the other two countries in this study El Salvador and Nicaragua. The 
economy is dominated by a small number of families who have also had key 
roles in the state. 9These families  
(around 22 in all) own almost all the principal means of production, as well 
as media outlets and have been key to the management and financing of the 
                                                 
8 The coup government claims to have support of almost 80 per cent of the population. 
It is unclear how they measure this. 
9 For example Carlos Flores Facussé was president between 1998 and 2002 and is an 
important supporter of the coup government. Eighty percent of the newspapers 
circulating in the country belong to one family, the Canahuati, while another, the Ferrari 
own one of the largest television groups, Televicentro, with five signals, and 17 radio 
stations. 
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coup.10 In order to understand political life in Honduras, it is imperative to 
capture the power of this group. In many ways, they encapsulate the most 
extreme patronage politics and the figure of the local ‘cacique’ underscores 
the political system. Honduras has been labelled a ‘captive’ democracy, 
where these powerful economic groups can veto state policy, including who 
becomes president, with many having their own members of congress. 
Politics is dominated by the two main traditional parties, the Liberals and 
the Nationals with strong ties to these powerful families. The state therefore 
becomes a ‘plunder’ state, where access for public goods is fought for by 
these powerful families through the institutions of the state. The result is a 
weak and fractured state, unable (or unwilling) to respond to the demands of 
the majority of the country’s inhabitants, who remain mired in poverty. 
Hence there is increasing estrangement from the parties, which is in danger 
of becoming a rejection of democracy – only about 50 per cent of the 
population voted in the last presidential elections in 2004.  
Manuel Rosales Zelaya was elected president in those elections with 
only 23 per cent of the vote. Coming from a rich rural family, he was the 
epitome of an oligarchic president. In the first two years of his mandate he 
did little to cause concern among Honduras’s economic and political elite, 
however, two shifts with historic policy began to cause concern within elite 
circles: his ties to leftist governments in the region and his dialogue with 
NGOs and social movements. In his final years he became increasingly close 
to President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, bringing Honduras into 
Venezuela’s Petrocaribe initiative the Venezuelan led Bolivarian Alternative 
for the Americas, ALBA.  
Zelaya’s social policy was in general in disarray: he had no 
development plan in place for most of his presidency; he lost important 
international cooperation funds, and many civil society actors distrusted the 
President’s erratic policy making procedures and unpredictability. 
Nonetheless, he began to provide greater space for civil society groups, 
holding popular assemblies in the presidential palace, for example.    
The increasing rift between those elites and the president 
crystallized when Zelaya proposed a referendum, to be held on the same day 
as the elections in November 2009, on Honduras instituting a Constituent 
Assembly to redraft the country’s constitution. The Honduran constitution 
was drafted as part of a civilian-military pact in 1982, and was seen to be 
outmoded by much of civil society. Many NGOs and social movements 
therefore embraced the idea as a possibility to have a greater say in the 
running of the country. The elites, however, who benefit most from the 
present situation, rejected it, with Congress and the Supreme Court 
declaring it illegal. Zelaya modified the proposal, to have a consultation on 
whether there should be a referendum and it was then that the army acted in 
overthrowing Zelaya and removing him from the country.  
The impact of the coup on civil society has transformed the deep 
levels of social polarisation within the country into a more pronounced 
political polarisation based on class structure. Whilst on the face of it this 
polarisation revolves around the figure of the president – into supposedly 
pro- and anti-Zelaya factions, in reality it is the embodiment of much deeper 
social fractures within Honduran society. Two main groups have emerged: 
those who do not support the coup and those who do. Those who are 
against the coup are made up of two main tendencies: those who were 
originally supporters of the president, some of whom now demand the 
constituent assembly and those who support the return of the constitutional 
                                                 
10 La Tercera, ‘Las 22 Familias más poderosas de Honduras hicieron sentir su peso tras el 
golpe’, in La Tercera, Sunday 12 July, 2009, p.13.  
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order, but who are not necessarily supporters of Zelaya.  The social base of 
these groups consists of indigenous, peasants, intellectuals, women’s 
organisations, some sections of the church such as the Jesuits and the 
Dominicans, labour unions, especially the powerful teacher’s union, lesbian 
and gay groups etc. These groups conform to Cox’s view of ‘alternative’ civil 
society. 
On the other hand those supporting the coup are the business 
groups, the media, the church hierarchy, including the country’s Cardinal 
Rodriguez, the political parties, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Armed 
Forces, the police and all the main institutions of the state. The social base 
on which this support rests are the church faithful, especially the more 
conservative elements. Allegations have been made that business groups 
have forced their workers to march in support of the coup government. 
Mass media campaigns and marches, heavily protected by the army and 
police have framed these groups under a careful rhetoric of national unity 
and claiming to be the true voice of civil society. The groups have called 
themselves the ‘whites’, in an effort to symbolise peace and purity. This 
stands in stark contrast with media portrayals of the anti-coup groups who 
have been dubbed as ‘mobs’ and ‘undesirable’. Social divisions around class 
were hence made visible by the coup, although these fissures are further 
crossed by ideological views of democracy, the pro-coup groups equating 
democracy with the existing institutional configuration, while the anti-coup 
groups, including middle class intellectuals, seeking a more inclusive form of 
democracy, with a more progressive, lay conception of the state. Polarisation 
has been made more acute by the delegitimisation of traditional mediators in 
Honduran society, such as the Church and even the Human Rights 
Ombudsman, which have aligned themselves clearly with the coup. As many 
respondents commented ‘all the masks had fallen’ and people’s true 
positions had been revealed.  
Such polarisation, however, has an additional international 
dimension as many identified this coup as a ‘laboratory’ strategy to defeat 
the advance of the ALBA initiative in Latin America with its close alliance 
with social movements in the region. While all Latin American countries 
condemned the coup and the OAS was at the forefront of action against it, 
the US has sent mixed signals and has been slow to act decisively against it, 
and conservative elements within the US establishment, as well as sections 
of the Miami Cuban and the Venezuelan right were said to be advising the 
coup plotters. Part of this strategy is to recast this battle in Cold War terms, 
with ALBA and Chávez depicted as the communist threat, and many 
respondents noted how old faces from the 1980s, who were involved with 
the war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador 
had resurfaced.  
The coup, at the time of writing almost two months old, is taking 
its toll on Honduran society, despite official denials. Human rights abuses 
have been rife since June 28, as a recent Amnesty International report 
attests, with murders, torture, numerous arrests, arbitrarily imposed curfews, 
denial of access to food, denial of freedom of association and movement all 
being reported . Media blackouts are common with the majority of the 
media supporting the coup with little regard for the truth, ignoring anti-coup 
demonstrations and vilifying anti-coup groups. The few anti-coup media 
outlets were harassed or closed and some foreign reporters arrested.11 Little 
of this has been reported overseas.  
                                                 
11 Amnesty International, 2009. Honduras: Human Rights crisis threatens as repression increases. 
Available from: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR37/004/2009/en. 
Downloaded: 27 Aug. 09 
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The gravity of the crisis has exacerbated fissures in civil society 
itself. NGOs were already divided around the figure of President Zelaya, 
and now over the coup against him. Some NGOs have refused to declare 
themselves against the coup due to the internal divisions within them made 
apparent by it. A further division has been made visible between wider social 
movements and NGOs. NGOs, while recognised as important spaces for 
discussion, are seen by activists as being ineffectual due to their refusal or 
inability to take political positions and actions. There is a lack of 
appreciation within them of the need to synchronize social with political 
struggles, they claim. NGOs are seen by some as substitutes for civil society, 
as unrepresentative, and fixated on changing laws in a country which has 
never had a political system ruled by laws, laws set by a state riddled with 
corruption and dominated by powerful interests resisting change.  
For the moment the future looks uncertain. Michelletti and the 
coup government are refusing to accept the will of the international 
community in restoring Zelaya to power and are continuing to prepare for 
elections, even though the new government may not be recognised 
internationally. The US continues to respond tepidly to this intransigence. 
Social movements working against the coup continue to struggle in the 
streets, but are worn down with exhaustion, repression and lack of resources 
and have no clear agreed strategy. Notwithstanding this differences, there is 
unprecedented cooperation between different elements of civil society, as 
most are agreed on the need to restore constitutional order, with the return 
of Zelaya as key.  There is agreement too that this is an historical moment in 
the country, which requires a rethink on the very basis of the Honduran 
nation, which could mean the continued insistence on a Constituent 
Assembly to redraft the constitution. The coup has been, therefore, as one 
respondent put it, a political Mitch, referring to the hurricane which 
devastated the country in 1998, “except this time the only bridge that has 
been blown down is that of democracy”. How Honduras will rebuild that 
bridge, if at all, remains to be seen, but it could well be that a civil society in 
its broadest sense will be central to that.  
 
Nicaragua: Civil Society or ‘Sociedad sí vil’?  
 
Daniel Ortega’ s return to power in January 2007, for the first time since the 
FSLN’s (Sandinista) defeat in elections in 1990, ended 16 years of 
conservative rule in Nicaragua. Since 1990 most of the principles and social 
advances of the Sandinista revolution (1979-1990) have been dismantled. 
Since Ortega’s re-election as president Nicaragua has been characterised by a 
deepening polarisation between the government and the social forces 
supporting it on the one hand, and on the other, many prominent NGOs, 
much of them historically linked to Sandinismo, the media, particularly the 
print media, and opposition parties. This polarisation is cemented around 
the figure of Daniel Ortega. On one hand, the  opposition views him as 
authoritarian and personalistic, while his government sees it as an ideological 
dispute over the role of the state and the nature and power of civil society 
itself.  
 Since the fall of Sandinismo in the 1990 elections successive Liberal 
led Nicaraguan governments have introduced wide ranging neoliberal 
reforms, much of this with Sandinista support. This neoliberalisation of 
Nicaragua was accompanied by a huge explosion of the NGO sector. Much 
of this increase in NGOs in the country emerged as a result of the 
Sandinista defeat, and most NGOs had links to the wider Sandinista 
movement, although not always specifically to the Frente, as the FSLN is 
commonly called.  
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The fall of Sandinismo in 1990 also saw the return to a more 
traditional form of politics in the country. After the election defeat to the 
coalition led by Violeta Chamorro, wife of an assassinated anti-Samoza hero, 
Joaquín Chamorro, many Sandinistas participated in what was popularly 
known as the ‘piñata’, whereby many state owned assets and properties were 
appropriated by Sandinista officials and public representatives. This 
reasserted a pattern whereby as one respondent puts it, the state is seen as 
‘plunder’ and public office a means to reap its benefits, with few ever being 
punished for this corruption. Political organisation is based on the leader, or 
the ‘cacique’ whose word is final, a pattern seen at all levels of Nicaraguan 
society, including NGOs. In both these ways Nicaragua has much in 
common with the political cultures of El Salvador and Honduras.  
During its 16 years out of power, Ortega and the FSLN built 
various pacts with elements of Liberalism in order to regain space in the 
state. The first of these was with Arnaldo Alemán, president from 1996, 
convicted of corruption in 2003, whereby Alemán ruled without opposition 
in return for granting the FSLN positions in the state. Another pact was 
with Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo before the elections in 2006, which 
led to the Sandinistas supporting the end of therapeutic abortion in return 
for Church support for Ortega’s election. Yet another was with the old 
enemy, the Contras, the counterinsurgency groups supported by the United 
States in the bitter war against the Sandinistas in the 1980s, when he 
appointed a former Contra leader, Jaime Morales, as his vice-presidential 
partner. These various pacts have created a confusion between left and right 
in Nicaragua; while the ‘Frente’ has built these pacts with reactionary rightist 
elements, the MRS (Sandinista Renovation Movement), a dissident 
Sandinista group led by Edmundo Jarquín has allied itself to the right-wing 
ALN (Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance) a spin-off or Alemán’s PLC 
(Constitutional Liberal Party), led by Eduardo Montealegre, a very 
successful, and somewhat questioned, banker. To add to this confusion, 
some NGOs which historically emerged from Sandinismo have also given 
support to Montealegre in their attempts to challenge the Ortega led 
government.  
As stated above, since the fall of the Sandinista revolution, the 
NGO sector expanded enormously in Nicaragua, supported by international 
cooperation funds, allowing it to become equated with the concept of civil 
society and it is over the terrain of this concept that much of current social 
and political polarisation has developed. On a discourse level the FSLN 
government claims that its objective is to change the neoliberal nature of 
Nicaragua, from one in which the market is given a pre-eminent role, to one 
where the state recuperates its role and forms a strong alliance with society. 
Key to this task is the strengthening of popular participation. Civil society in 
this conception is about people exercising citizenship, and one of the chief 
vehicles for this new model is the Citizen’s Power Councils (CPCs), of 
which more later.  
NGOs have a reduced role in this emerging model. The Sandinista 
government, recognizes the skills, knowledge and capacity within NGOs, 
and hence in Nicaragua as in El Salvador, many NGO personnel are now 
working with the government. NGOs, however, do not have primacy as 
representatives of the citizenry, a role persistently questioned by the 
government, with the President himself accusing them of enrichment and 
the First Lady, Rosario Murillo, calling NGO’s ‘sociedad sí vil’ – ‘vile society’ -  
and a play on the Spanish for civil society – sociedad civil. Links between 
NGOs and United States funders associated with political meddling in Latin 
American politics – not least in Nicaragua - such as the National 
Endowment for Democracy and USAid - are often pointed to as threats to 
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the Nicaraguan state. Government officials also claim that in the final 
analysis NGOs can only represent themselves, they cannot claim any wider 
mandates, because of their unelected status, unlike government. 
This situation reached its nadir in 2008 when a number of national 
and international NGOs, including Oxfam were accused of money 
laundering. Feminist organisations in particular were placed in the front line, 
with the first lady calling them the ‘Trojan horse of imperialism’.  While 
feminist organisations were singled out, according to their view, due to their 
opposition to the criminalisation of therapeutic abortion and to their 
support for Ortega’s stepdaughter, Zoila America Narvaez, who accused 
him of sexual abuse, NGOs in general are under fire because they are seen 
as competitors with the Frente, and hence the state, both for consciences and 
for resources. While many NGOs are vehemently opposed to the 
government, others are torn between this view and wishing to avoid conflict 
with the government, while others still are more cooperative with it. Many 
NGOs, supported by the media, accuse the government of being totalitarian 
not unlike the Samozas. The above mentioned CPCs are especially singled 
out by critics as a means to achieve that objective.  
CPCs are neighbourhood based committees with the objective of 
improving local access to services. They are elected by local communities in 
open assembly, with usually around 12 members, each of which takes 
responsibility for a particular social area – such as women, the environment, 
health, education etc. Their chief function is to identify alongside the 
community local needs, formulate projects to satisfy those needs, 
coordinating with local municipalities, which help them to secure funding 
and/or materials. Communities then further participate by providing the 
labour to build these projects.  
CPCs also administer the flagship government projects, Zero 
Hunger – whereby local women receive loans in kind to allow them to farm 
on a small scale – and Zero Profit, where local people can get access to 
microloans to start small enterprises. CPCs along with the local community 
identify the people who would most benefit from these government 
schemes, acting in effect as the liaison mechanism between the 
neighbourhood and the state. Analysts identify mixed results for CPCs, 
claiming that it often depends on the level of cooperation in a particular 
municipality and how well that functioned prior to the arrival of CPCs. 
While the government claims that CPCs are the vehicles for a new model of 
citizenship, critics within NGOs and the media identify them as a vehicle for 
the extension and perpetuation of FSLN power, being essentially sectarian 
and exclusive in character, which the government denies. Another concern 
is that they inhibit existing organisational models. Most importantly, some 
NGOs see CPCs as indoctrination mechanisms, reducing citizen autonomy 
of thought and action with CPCs increasingly occupying social spaces and 
acting as gatekeepers for access to social goods.  
The different interpretations of CPCs are emblematic of the 
polarised views on the Sandinista government led by Daniel Ortega. The 
government views their policies as instruments to achieve the end of 
neoliberalism, while critics within the NGOs in particular see the 
government as a continuation of neoliberalism due to the business interests 
of Ortega, continued cooperation with the IMF etc. While the government 
sees its policies as the beginnings of a new pact between society and the 
state, its most ferocious critics see it as a totalitarian project aimed at 
perpetuating Ortega and the FSLN in power. While the government claims 
that polarisation is media driven and mostly Managua based, many within 
the NGOs and the media fear that it is so acute it could engulf the country 
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in a new civil war. How these diametrically opposed visions can be 
reconciled is difficult to imagine in the current context.  
 
Conclusions: The end of ‘Civil Society’? 
 
Each of the countries has similar economic, social and political structures, 
with a high concentration of capital in the hands of a few powerful families 
in each country, who wield uncommon influence in the political structures. 
This power is underpinned by internal support coming from the Church and 
the media, as well as external support from more conservative elements 
within the United States political and economic establishment. In Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, however, a left-wing alternative party exists which emerged 
from the guerrilla movements of each country and which recently achieved 
power after many years of conservative, neoliberal governments. While 
Honduras does not have a similar left wing party, a Liberal oligarchic 
president nonetheless began to implement some policies normally associated 
with the left. Each country therefore has at least nominally experienced a 
shift to the left bringing them into line with the current zeitgeist in the wider 
region.  
 In each case this shift to the left has presented challenges to civil 
society. Processes of co-optation have presented themselves in each case, as 
many NGOs are historically linked to the present parties in power, or offers 
of inclusion were sufficiently attractive to present co-operation as an option. 
This presents problems and opportunities to civil society organisation – 
problems in terms of maintaining autonomy and a critical distance, 
opportunities in terms of having unprecedented access to influence 
decision-making processes. Furthermore, in each case questions have been 
raised as to the nature of civil society itself, with the equation of civil society 
equals NGO being questioned, and the search for a wider, more inclusive 
conception more aligned with ideas of citizenship. This has been brought to 
its most radical form in Nicaragua where the government has embarked on 
an all out effort to curtail the power of NGOs in favour of its own CPC 
initiative. In Honduras too the government of President Zelaya reached out 
to trade unions, peasant and indigenous groups, to seek endorsement of its 
projected Constituent Assembly process, which was seen as a possibility for 
widening citizen involvement in decision-making processes. The findings 
therefore raise questions on the usefulness of civil society as an analytical 
concept in the current context in Central America.  
 Such questions around the usefulness of the civil society concept 
are further highlighted with the evident fractures found in society, whereby 
some groups, including NGOs are privileged over others depending on the 
political context of the time. In El Salvador ARENA favoured business 
oriented NGOs, while now the new FSLN government favours social 
NGOs historically linked to the FMLN. In Nicaragua meanwhile most 
NGOs are sidelined by government, including those historically linked to 
the FSLN, in favour of new conceptions of civil participation. In Honduras, 
attempts at greater inclusion of previously excluded groups, such as peasants 
and indigenous, by President Zelaya were halted by a coup favouring 
business and conservative religious groups. ‘Civil society’ is divided along 
class, religious, ethnic and economic grounds. It is also divided along 
ideological lines, as seen in Honduras as groups lined up in favour or against 
the coup. 
 Yet ideology also presents a slippery terrain for analysis. While 
nominally in El Salvador and Nicaragua there are left wing parties in power, 
and while in Honduras Zelaya shifted to the left in the later two years of his 
still unfinished presidential term, many would not refer to these 
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governments as being leftist. President Funes in El Salvador came from 
outside the FMLN party structure, being a well known media figure, who 
also developed close links with some important business families, such as 
supermarket magnates, the Salumé. Zelaya in Honduras is from a rich, 
oligarchic family, who many claimed did little to undermine capital’s 
position in the country. Meanwhile in Nicaragua, with FSLN officials’ 
ownership of important businesses and properties, its record supporting the 
introduction of neoliberal policies in the last 16 years, and Ortega’s close 
association with the most reactionary elements of the Catholic Church, the 
Frente’s left wing credentials could be open to question. Hence there is 
ideological slippage in what are nominally referred to as ‘pink tide’ 
governments, raising questions about the extent to which these governments 
are left at all.  
 The equation in Latin America between leader and party also raises 
questions of the nature of the state in Central America. As we have seen the 
state is extremely weak in the region and easily dominated by the powerful 
economic families found in each country, which have also extended their 
reach throughout the region. But while powerful families can dominate the 
economy, strong leaders can dominate parties. With its presidential tradition, 
Latin American leaders dominate parties, which when in government can 
attempt to dominate the state, creating an equation of 
leader=party=government=state. This phenomenon, alongside that of the 
influence of important families, raises questions on the autonomy and 
nature of the state in the region. The extent to which the actual concept of 
civil society and who it includes is dependent on the government of the day 
rather than the institutions of state is an important issue to be considered 
when looking at civil society/state relations in the region.  
 Such swings in policy can further contribute to the other key theme 
identified in this study, polarisation. While in each country social 
polarisation is a permanent feature due to the high levels of poverty found 
in each of them, such polarisation does not always manifest itself politically. 
This can occur, however, when a government begins to implement policies 
in favour of previously excluded groups which can be perceived by power 
groups as threatening the status quo. Political and social polarisation can 
emerge in such a scenario, threatening the stability of the state. This was 
most acute in Honduras, where Zelaya’s efforts at reform led to a coup, and 
in Nicaragua where there is open confrontation between the government 
and NGOs, opposition parties and media. It was also apparent in the 
ferocity of the presidential campaign in El Salvador, which while abated for 
the moment, could re-emerge depending on how the present government 
advances in the social and economic terrain. Questions which emerge 
therefore are: to what extent is polarisation informed by existing social 
cleavages, and how can structural change be achieved without aggravating 
existing polarisation into a crisis of the state?  
 All these issues have bearing on sustainable development policies. 
With the change in governments, we see new configurations emerging 
between the two main recipients of international cooperation funds – 
NGOs and the state. How these configurations consolidate themselves 
could dictate how these funds can be distributed in the future. In Nicaragua, 
for example, we have seen attacks by the government on NGOs, both 
national and international, and a demonstrated desire to receive a larger 
share of development funds. In El Salvador we are beginning to see closer 
cooperation between state and NGOs, and more state action on social 
issues. What implications will this have for funding? Should government 
receive greater share of development funds to support these efforts? In 
Honduras, we have seen a coup which has led to the suspension of 
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development aid to that country from the European Union. This could 
result, as one respondent told us, in increased child labour as policy for 
children is almost entirely dependent on external funding. How does the 
international development community respond to these changes to ensure 
that development funding achieves sustainability? 
 Particularly pertinent for the Active Citizenship in Central America 
project is the study’s indications of difficulties and contradictions in the very 
concept of civil society.  As many Latin American societies begin to move 
away from strictly liberal conceptions of civil society, with its sharp 
distinctions between civil society and the state, so development projects in 
that area need to reflect this shift. More space needs to be devoted to 
exploring the meaning of the term and indeed to question its very 
usefulness. This is to an extent being addressed by the project through the 
introduction of content in the curriculum on the meaning and role of civil 
society in modern democracies and of NGOs within that. More work needs 
to be done, however, on ensuring that the working definition of civil society 
be widened to include social movements, trade unions and other groups 
which do not normally receive funding due to their not being constituted as 
NGOs or their marginalised situation within Central American societies. 
 Another useful way to explore these themes further would be to 
carry out a more detailed case study. Many of those interviewed suggested 
that Honduras would be an ideal case study because of the recent events 
there which have thrown into stark relief many of the major issues 
indentified in this study.  
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Appendix 1: List ff Research Activities  
 
 
DATE NAME OR POPULATION NATURE 
OF EVENT 
LOCATION 
EL SALVADOR, SAN SALVADOR 
17 JULY REGIONAL COMMITTEE ACTIVE 
CITIZENSHIP PROJECT 
ROUND 
TABLE 
DISCUSSION 
TERRAZA HOTEL 
20 JULY ACADEMICS ROUND 
TABLE 
DISCUSSION 
CENTRAL 
AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY (UCA), 
SAN SALVADOR 
DEYSI CHEYNI, DIRECTOR, 
WOMEN’S INSTITUTE (IMU), NGO 
INTERVIEW OFFICES (IMU) 21 JULY 
DR. MIGUEL ORRELLANA, 
SALVADORAN ASSOCIATION FOR 
HEALTH PROMOTION (ASPS).  
INTERVIEW OFFICES ASPS 
22 JULY YOUNG LEADERS FOCUS 
GROUP  
CECADE NGO 
24 JULY DIPLOMA STUDENTS FOCUS 
GROUP 
UCA  
HONDURAS (TEGUCIGALPA, SANTA ROSA DE COPAN, SAN PEDRO SULA – 
TEGUS, SRC, SPS) 
MABEL HERNÁNDEZ, FONDO 
ACI-ERP 
INTERVIEW TROCAIRE 
OFFICES, TEGUS 
HÉCTOR RENÁN SOTO, 
CIVIL SOCIETY GROUP (GSC) 
INTERVIEW GSC OFFICES, 
TEGUS 
27 JULY 
 
ACADEMICS AND GENERAL 
PUBLIC 
PANEL 
DISCUSSION 
NATIONAL 
AUTONOMOUS 
UNIVERISTY OF 
HONDURAS 
(UNAH), TEGUS 
RAF FLORES, DEPUTY 
COORDINATOR, FOSDEH, NGO 
INTERVIEW TROCAIRE 
OFFICES, TEGUS 
28 JULY 
 
GILBERTO RIOS, DIRECTOR, FIAN 
(FOOD FIRST INFORMATION AND 
ACTION NETWORK) HONDURAS. 
INTERVIEW TROCAIRE 
OFFICES, TEGUS 
30 JULY NGOS AND MUNICIPALITIES.  ROUND 
TABLE 
DISCUSSION 
EROC, , REGIONAL 
SPACE OF WEST 
HONDURAS.SANTA 
ROSA DE COPAN 
31 JULY SOCIAL FORUM OF SULA VALLEY, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NGOS 
ROUND 
TABLE 
DISCUSSION 
MENONITE 
CENTRE, SAN 
PEDRO SULA 
1 AUG CODEMUH, WOMEN’S 
ORGANISATION 
PANEL 
DISCUSSION 
CODEMUH 
OFFICES 
NICARAGUA – MANAGUA, MASAYA 
ACADEMICS ROUND 
TABLE  
CENTRAL 
AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY, 
MANAGUA 
MARIA LOPEZ VIGIL, EDITOR 
ENVIO MAGAZINE, ACADEMIC 
INTERVIEW UCA 
4 AUG 
 
SOFIA MONTENEGRO, CINCO, 
MEDIA NGO 
INTERVIEW CINCO OFFICES 
5 AUG CITIZENS POWER COUNCIL PUBLIC 
MEETING 
PEOPLE’S HOUSE, 
FSLN OFFICES, 
MASAYA 
SIXTO ULLOA, OMBUDSMAN FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STAFF, 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL 
INTERVIEW OFFICES OF THE 
OMBUDSMAN FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
6 AUG 
WOMEN’S ORGANISATION, 
GRUPO VENANCIA 
INTERVIEW LUNCH 
7 AUG RODOLFO DELGADO, 
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL 
INTERVIEW OFFICE OF MR. 
DELGADO 
 
